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THE MIRAGE OF RETROACTIVITY AND CHANGING
CONSTITUTIONAL CONCEPTS
BY CHARLES E. TORCIA* AND DONALD B. KING**
Assisted by Thomas J. Mangan, Jr.
During recent times, the Supreme Court of the United States has seen
fit to confer upon the individual broader constitutional protection. Mapp v.
Ohio,' decided in 1961, is illustrative of this modern movement. There, it
was held that "all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of
the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court."2
However, in the course of such constitutional extensions,3 one challenging
question with far-reaching consequences has been left virtually unanswered:
shall these new protections be given retroactive effect? 4 While attention
has not been focused on this question, it is one which has been "crying out"
for an answer. Even now, both federal and state courts are expressing their
need for guidance. 5 As Chief Judge Thomsen of the Federal District Court
in Maryland recently observed: "Until the Supreme Court itself clarifies
the point, it is impossible for any other court or judge to be certain whether
and to what extent the Supreme Court intended the decision in Mapp v.
Ohio to be retrospective." 6 In light of this pressing problem and because
the question undoubtedly will arise in related areas in the future, it is imperative that the state of the law be clarified and that the problem be
* Associate Professor of Law, Dickinson School of Law; LL.B., 1954, St. Johns
University School of Law; LL.M., 1961, New York University.
** Assistant Professor of Law, Dickinson School of Law; B.S., 1954, Washington
State University; LL.B., 1957, Harvard University.
1. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
2. Id. at 665.
3. Within the past several decades a number of new constitutional protections
have evolved: Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (Due process requires that a
state, in a capital case, provide counsel for an indigent accused) ; Brown v. Miss., 297
U.S. 278 (1936) (Confessions extorted by brutality and violence are inconsistent with
due process required by the fourteenth amendment) ; Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458
(1938) (assignment of counsel in federal criminal proceedings even in non-capital
cases) ; Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945) (Conviction resting in part upon
a coerced confession will be set aside) ; Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1951)
(Illegally violating the privacy of an individual's body in order to obtain evidence
offends those personal immunities which due process guarantees). Surprisingly, the
United States Supreme Court was not faced with deciding the question of retroactivity
following these landmark cases. A careful study of the cases following the above decisions indicates that when the courts have been confronted with the question of applying
these decisions to prior factual settings, retroactivity was generally not even mentioned and other grounds were used to dispose of such cases.
4. The authors of this article are using the term "retroactive" in its broadest
sens6--the application of new constitutional concepts to prior factual settings.
5. See p. 276 infra.
6. Hall v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary, Civil No. 13450, D. Md., January 23,
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squarely faced. It is the view of the writers, as will be demonstrated herein,
that the problem of retroactivity is an illusory one.
DEVELOPMENT OF RETROACTIVITY

The development of law by the Supreme Court concerning the retroactive
application of expanded constitutional rights of the individual is relatively
modern. While it is true that the Supreme Court has devoted some attention
to retroactivity in other areas, 7 it is only within the last decade that the Court
has addressed itself to the problem in the area of newly enunciated constitutional safeguards.
In 1956, the decision in Griffin v. Illinois,8 holding that a state must,
under the Federal Constitution, afford indigent defendants adequate appellate
review, set the stage for the Court's discussion of the retroactivity problem.
Justice Black, joined by Chief Justice Warren, and Justices Douglas and
Clark, declared their confidence that Illinois would "provide corrective rules
to meet the problem which this case lays bare."9 Nevertheless, they did not
expressly deal with the question of retroactive application of their decision.
Justice Frankfurter, however, in a portion of his concurring opinion,
dealt explicitly with the retroactivity problem. He observed that "there
are undoubtedly convicts under confinement in Illinois prisons, in numbers
unknown to us and under unappealed sentences imposed years ago, who will
find justification in this opinion, unless properly qualified, for proceedings
both in the state and the federal courts upon claims that they are under
illegal detention in that they have been denied a right under the Federal
Constitution.' 10 As he saw it, "for sound reasons, law generally speaks
prospectively" and, "in arriving at a new principle, the judicial process
is not impotent to define its scope and limits."" Accordingly, he felt that
2
"the rule of law announced this day should be delimited as indicated.'
According to the dissenting opinion of Justices Burton and Minton, with
whom Justices Reed and Harlan joined, the opinion of Justice Black "is not
limited to the future. It holds that a past as well as a future conviction of
crime in a state court is invalid where the state has failed to furnish a free
transcript to an indigent defendant who has sought, as petitioner did here,
to obtain a review of a ruling that was dependent upon the evidence in his
case."' 3 The giving of retroactive effect, they felt, would be "an interference
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

See p. 290 infra.
351 U.S. 12 (1956).
Id. at 20.
Id. at 25.
Id. at 26.
Ibid.
Supra note 8, at 29.
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with state power for what may be a desirable result, but which we believe to
4
be within the field of local option.'
Justice Harlan, in a separate dissenting opinion, after indicating that
"the sweeping constitutional pronouncement made by the Court today will
touch the laws of at least 19 states and will create a host of problems
u5
felt
affecting the status of an unknown multitude of indigent convicts,'

that "a decision having such wide impact should not be made upon a record
6
as obscure as this."'
Thus the Court in Griffin did not settle the question of retroactivity:
four of the members of the majority did not expressly deal with the question;
the fifth member of the majority felt that only prospective effect should be
given and that the majority opinion should have been so delimited; and the
four dissenting Justices construed the majority opinion as giving retroactive
effect and evinced their opposition to such a principle. In light of these
varying views, the area of retroactivity remained a clouded one.
17
Nevertheless, some states saw fit to give retroactive effect to Griffin.
Illinois, through the rule-making power of its supreme court, gave effect to
Griffin by providing "for a full transcript to any appellant requesting it,
found indigent by the trial judge."' 8 Prisoners who had been convicted prior
to Griffin were given until March 1, 1957, to apply for free transcripts. In
Cook County alone, which concerns itself with about one-half of the state's
litigation, it appears that over 500 pre-Griffin petitions were granted.1 9
The next Supreme Court case to shed light on the problem of retro20
activity was Eskridge v. Washington State Bd. of Prison Terms & Paroles,
decided in 1958. In a state court of Washington, in 1935, the accused had
been convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. "Alleging
substantial errors in his trial petitioner moved for a free transcript," 21 in
order to take an appeal to the state supreme court. This motion was denied
by the trial judge in accordance with a Washington statute which provided
for an indigent defendant to be furnished with a free transcript if, in the,
opinion of the trial judge, "justice [would] thereby be promoted. '22 In
14.
15.
16.
17.
2 Misc.
18.

Ibid.
Supra note 8, at 33.
Ibid.
Barber v. Gladden, 210 Ore. 46, 298 P.2d 986 (1956) ; People v. Jackson,
2d 521, 152 N.Y.S.2d 893 (1956).
WILKES, POsT-CONVICTION CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF

DEFENDANTS:

STATE

INTERPRETATIONS

OF GRIFFIN V. ILLINOIS,

INDIGENT

CRIMINAL

INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL

App. 1-4 (1959). See Note, The Effect of ,Griflin v. Illinois on the
States' Administration of the Criminal Low, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 161 (1957).
19. Ibid.; see Note, Effect of Overruling Prior Judgments on Constitutional Issues,
ADMINISTRATION,

43 VA. L. REV. 1279, 1293 (1957).

20. 357 U.S. 214 (1958).
21. Id. at 215.
22. Ibid.
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1956, the prisoner by way of habeas corpus claimed that the refusal of a
free transcript constituted a violation of his rights under the fourteenth
amendment. The Washington Supreme Court denied his petition without
opinion and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 23 In a per curiam opinion,
the majority declared: "In Griffin . . . we held that a State denies a con-

stitutional right guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment if it allows all
convicted defendants to have appellate review except those who cannot afford
to pay for the records of their trials. We hold that Washington has denied
this constitutional right here."'24 The majority further stated that it was not
holding that "a State must furnish a transcript in every case involving an
indigent defendant. But here, as in the Griffin case, we do hold that,
'[d]estitute defendants must be afforded as adequate appellate review as
defendants who have money enough to buy transcripts.' "25 Noting that the
reporter's transcript from the 1935 trial was still available, 26 the court
reversed and remanded.
A single-sentence dissent noted that Justices Harlan and Whittaker,
"believing that on this record the Griffin case, decided in 1956, should not be
27
applied to this conviction occurring in 1935, would affirm the judgment."
Justice Frankfurter, who did not hear the argument, took no part in the
disposition of the case.
There is no doubt but that the question of whether Griffin should be given
retroactive effect was squarely raised and presented to the United States
Supreme Court:
(1) In his application for habeas corpus to the Washington
state court, the prisoner "called attention to the decision . . . in
2

Griffin v. Illinois." 8
(2) The prisoner's petition to the United States Supreme Court
for certiorari contained the following: "There is involved here
petitioner's rights under Article I, Section 22 ... of the Constitution

of the State of Washington; Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States; and by the recent
ruling of this Honorable Court in the case of Judson Griffin and
James Crenshaw v. The
People of the State of Illinois, No. 95'
'
October Term, 1955. 29

23. Eskridge v. Washington State Bd. of Prison Terms & Paroles, 353 U.S. 922
(1957).
24. Eskridge v. Washington State Bd. of Prison Terms & Paroles, supra note 20,
at 216.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid. Note here that Justice Burton, who sided with the dissent in Griffin, has
joined the ranks of the majority of the Court in this case.
28. Brief for Petitioner, p. 12, Eskridge v. Washington State Bd. of Prison Terms
& Paroles, supra note 20.
29. Id. at 13.

1962]

THE MIRAGE OF RETROACTIVITY

(3) Interspersed throughout the prisoner's brief before the
Supreme 0Court is reference to and reliance upon the recent Griffin
decision.A
(4) The first point in the brief of the State of Washington was:
"THE DECISION IN GRIFFIN V. ILLINOIS SHOULD
BE LIMITED TO A PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION." 3'
This position is reiterated in the first sentence of the "Summary
of Argument," 32 and in the "Conclusion" where the following
language appears: "The social consequences of a retroactive applicaThe limitation we protion of the Griffin decision would be serious.
33
pose is therefore strongly indicated."
(5) The dissenting position of Justices Harlan and Whittaker
certainly indicates that some kind of a controversy 3concerning
4
retroactivity existed among the members of the Court.
It is clear that the majority in Eskridge, in 1958, held that the denial
of a free transcript to the prisoner in 1935 was violative of his rights under
the fourteenth amendment-viewed in light of Griffin. 5 It is not clear, however, from the language employed in the majority opinion in Eskridge
whether the Court's rationale is (1) a requirement that the State of
Washington give retroactive application to the Griffin decision, or (2) simply
a use of Griffin as a precedent for its disposition of a new and independent,
though closely related, case. The former would seem to be a more direct
"front door" approach to retroactivity; the latter, an elusive "back door"
approach. For, in either event, it is obvious that the result is the same: a
contemporary constitutional concept is being applied to an earlier factual
setting.
Onto this stage 6 was thrown, in June 1961, Mapp v. Ohio.37 A
majority of the Supreme Court held that the admission in a state court of
30. Id. at pp. 12, 13, 15, 27n., 28, 30, 31, 34n., 35, 43, 46, 48n.
31. Brief for Respondent, p. 13, Eskridge v. Washington State Bd. of Prison
Terms & Paroles, supra note 20.
32. Id. at 11.
33. Id. at 35.
34. Eskridge v. Washington State Bd. of Prison Terms & Paroles, supra note 20,
at 216.
35. By way of a reinforcement of the Eskridge decision and an apparent application
of the retroactive feature, see Ross v. Schneckloth, 357 U.S. 575 (1958) ; Woods v.
t
Rhay, 357 U.S. 575 (1958).
36. Another case which is worthy of note is Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959).
In 1953, in an Ohio state court, petitioner had been convicted of burglary and sentenced
to life imprisonment. An intermediate appellate court affirmed the conviction. He filed a
notice of appeal, "but did nothing further until 1957, when he sought to file a copy of
the earlier notice of appeal and a motion for leave to appeal in the Supreme Court of
Ohio." Id. at 253. Since he was unable to pay the docket fee required by the Ohio
statute, his motion was not entertained. The United States Supreme Court, feeling that
the Griflln decision was not distinguishable, vacated the judgment below. It should be
emphasized, however, that the petitioner's attempt to appeal in 1957 was, "despite the
passage of years," regarded by the court as "timely." Ibid.
37. Supra note 1.
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evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure was violative
of the fourteenth amendment.A8 This enunciation of a new constitutional
right necessitated the Court's overruling Wolf v. Colorado,9 decided in
1949. Curiously, in light of the impact of its decision, neither the majority
nor the other members of the Court expressly dealt with the problem of
retroactivity. Indeed, in light of the controversy among the members of
the 'Court relating to retroactivity in the Griflin setting, and its aftermath
in Eskridge, this is especially astounding. Nevertheless, it should be noted
that there may be a clue to the Court's attitude in one of the footnotes in
the majority opinion. The pertinent portion of the text of the majority
opinion read:
There are those who say, as did Justice (then Judge) Cardozo,
that under our constitutional exclusionary doctrine "[t]he criminal
is to go free because the constable has blundered." . . . In some cases
40
this will undoubtedly be the result.

The footnote referable to that part of the text read:
As is always the case, however, state procedural requirements
governing assertion and pursuance of direct and collateral constitutional challenges to criminal prosecutions must be respected. We
note, moreover, that the class of state convictions possibly affected
by this decision is of relatively narrow compass when compared with
Burns v. State of Ohio, 360 U. S. 252, . . . Griffin v. People of
State of Illinois, 351 U. S. 12, . . . and Commonwealth of Penn-

sylvania ex rel. Herman v. Claudy, 350 U. S. 116... . In those
cases the same contention was urged and later proved unfounded.
In any case, further delay in reaching the present result
could
41
have no effect other than to compound the difficulties.
This footnote may be interpreted by some to mean that the Court
intends retroactive effect to be given to its decision. 42 In support of such
a view it might be reasoned that the "illegal search and seizure" class of
convictions which would be affected by retroactivity would be narrower
than the class of indigent prisoners who were denied appellate review under
38. Ibid. The holding of the Court in Mapp does not concern itself merely with
a rule of evidence but rather with actual rights guaranteed by the Constitution. "Having
once recognized that the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment is
enforceable against the States, and that the right to be secure against rude invasions
of privacy by state officers is, therefore, Constitutional in origin, we can no longer
permit that right to remain an empty promise. . . . Our decision, founded on reason
and truth, gives to the individual no more than that which the Constitution guarantees
him." Supra note 1, at 660.
39. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
40. Mapp v. Ohio, supra note 1, at 659.
41. Id. n.9.
42. For a brief discussion of this possible "hint," see Morris, The End of an
Experiment in Federalism-A Note on Mapp v. Ohio, 36 WASH. L. REV. 407, 432

(1961).
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Griffin, which of course would involve any and all kinds of convictions.
Further, the latter portion of the footnote might be construed as referring
to the "unfounded" contention that too many criminals would go free, and
that "further delay" would only "compound the difficulties" by increasing
the number of prisoners who would be affected by retroactivity. It is noteworthy, however, that in the footnote the Court did not expressly mention
"retroactivity" or its equivalent, nor did it cite the very pertinent and recent
Eskridge case. In the opinion of the writers, the footnote alone does not give
48
rise to a reasonable inference upon which any fair opinion can be grounded.
It is readily understandable, since the Court did not expressly mention
retroactivity or discuss the problem, why learned judges in both the federal
and state courts have been experiencing difficulty in determining the
intention of the Court in Mapp.44 This void in the opinion, however, may
have significant and far-reaching implications which are not apparent on the
surface. In Griffin, it will be recalled, the majority opinion did not expressly
deal with the question of retroactive effect. The four dissenting Justices,
noting that the majority opinion was "not limited to the future," concluded
that the "majority" Justices intended that their decision should be referable
to "a past as well as a future conviction. ' 45 Justice Frankfurter, in his concurring opinion, observed that many pre-Griffln prisoners "will find justification in this opinion, unless properly qualified." 46 Accordingly, after noting
his opposition to retroactive application, he urged that "the rule of law
announced this day should be delimited. '47 Hence, five Justices (a majority)
were of the view that if the decision were not expressly limited to the future,
that meant that retroactive effect was intended or might be viewed as having
been intended. In the Mapp case, as in Griffin, the majority of the Court
did not limit the newly enunciated constitutional right to the future. Some
of the "Mapp" Justices participated in the Griffin decision, and hence, it would
seem, should have been painfully aware of the above-described view. 48
43. While some might assert that retroactivity is not warranted because of the
gradual development of the law culminating in the Mapp case, it should be noted that
individual rights outweigh state policies of reliance (see p. 288 infra) and that individual
rights are not the proper object of experimentation by courts. Certainly, if the experiment malfunctions everything possible should be done to remedy constitutional wrongs
to the individual affected.
44. See discussion on p. 276 infra.
45. Griffin v. Illinois, supra note 8, at 29.
46. Id. at 25.
47. Id. at 26.
48. In Griffin the majority consisted of Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black,
Douglas and Clark. Justice Frankfurter concurred with the majority. The dissent
was composed of Justices Burton, Minton, Reed and Harlan. In Eskridge, the majority
consisted of Chief Justice Warren, and Justices Black, Douglas, Clark, Brennan and
Burton; the minority of Justices Harlan and Whittaker. In the Mapp case the line-up
of the Court was as follows: majority-Justice Clark, Chief Justice Warren; con-
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Indeed, it would seem that even the post-Griffin Justices should not have
been unaware of the approach taken in Griffin. Therefore, it may be argued
with a good deal of force that, since the Supreme Court in Mapp did not
expressly limit its new constitutional position to the future only, retroactive
effect was intended or might be viewed as having been intended.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court may well feel impelled, in the relatively
near future, to address itself sharply to the problem of retroactivity and,
instead of leaving it to elusive inference, to commit itself on the perplexing
problem with which, for example, many post-Mapp courts have been confronted. The following cases are illustrative.
In United States ex rel. Gregory v. New York, 49 the petitioner, a state
prisoner, applied in a Federal District Court for a writ of habeas corpus.
Petitioner had originally been convicted of grand larceny and sentenced to
seven and one-half to ten years as a second felony offender. The conviction
had been affirmed by the various appellate courts and certiorari had been
denied by the Supreme Court. In his application for a writ of habeas corpus,
petitioner raised the question of illegally seized evidence. The court observed:
"In the Mapp majority opinion, it is not clear whether or not such ruling
is to have prospective or retroactive effect." 50 Keeping in mind the footnote
of Justice Clark in the Mapp opinion, the court concluded:
It is not evident from the petition whether the question of
alleged search and seizure as claimed was presented to and reviewed
by the Courts of New York. In courtesy to the Courts of New York,
it would seem recanvass of these situations should be made by them
or state appellate reargument sought, before petitions with this
challenge should be entertained in this district court.51
The court thereupon dismissed the petition.
That the scope of the Mapp decision is unclear in several respects
was brought out by Judge Clark of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals,
speaking for the majority in Bolger v. Cleary,52 wherein the plaintiff had
attempted to enjoin state officials from testifying in state proceedings against
him as to statements made by the plaintiff during his illegal detention by
federal officers. He had also sought to block state officials from introducing
property which he claimed was illegally seized during an unlawful search
of his home. In discussing Mapp, the court declared:
If it were clear that Mapp barred all use by the State of the
illegally obtained evidence here involved, the injunction below could
curring-Justices Douglas, Black and Stewart; dissenting-Justices Harlan, Frankfurter and Whittaker.
49. 195 F. Supp. 527 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
50. Id. at 528.
51. Ibid.
52. 293 F.2d 368 (2d Cir. 1961).
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properly be dissolved ....

The scope of Mapp is, however, unclear

in several regards, such as its application to federal statutory or
rule, as well as constitutional prohibitions or to state administrative
proceedings . . .5
It appears by way of dicta that the courts of Pennsylvania may well
give retroactive effect to the Mapp decision. The superior court in Commonwealth v. Campbell54 affirmed a conviction of defendant Campbell on charges
of committing an abortion. In the course of argument the defendant
contended that his constitutional rights had been denied because of the
lower court's refusal to permit counsel to cross-examine on the question of
probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant. The court observed that
at the time of the trial evidence was admissible even though it was the product
of an illegally issued warrant. Consequently, it was said, the lower court
did not err in denying counsel the right to cross-examine. The defendant
admitted this was the law as it then existed, but in light of the complete
change brought about by Mapp he pressed error. The court replied: "This
contention would be meritorious if illegality in obtaining the search warrant
had been shown. However, there is nothing in the record to show illegality.
...

Therefore, the change in the law effected by Mapp v. Ohio . .. is not ap-

plicable." 55 (Emphasis added.)
The superior court of New Jersey recently dismissed56 a prisoner's attempt
to use Mapp to gain his freedom under a writ of habeas corpus. The
petitioner had been convicted in February 1959, on a charge of possessing
heroin. At the time of petitioner's trial he failed to take the stand and did
not raise the question of illegally obtained evidence or a possible violation of
his constitutional rights. The court said:
The recent decision in Mapp v. Ohio has aroused the petitioner's
desire to gain his freedom . . . 7
The petitioner has been incarcerated for the past two years
and apparently has had a reading acquaintance with those federal
decisions which have construed illegal search and seizure ....

The

petitioner's testimony lacks trustworthiness, although if it had been
given at the time of the trial it might have justified some consideration to justify the position he now takes. 58
9
the defendant, who had pleaded guilty prior to
In People v. Bertrand"
the Mapp decision, sought to withdraw his plea on the day of sentencing be-

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 370.
196 Pa. Super. 380, 175 A.2d 324 (1961).
Id. at 387, 175 A.2d at 328.
Application of Bogish, 69 N.J. Super. 146, 173 A.2d 906 (Law Div. 1961).
Id. at -, 173 A.2d at 908.
Id. at -, 173 A.2d at 909.
28 Misc. 2d 1084, 216 N.Y.S.2d 790 (1961).
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cause of the Mapp decision. The defendant tried to show that the state's
evidence had been acquired through an illegal search and seizure. In dismissing the motion, the court held that such a matter was addressed to the discretion of the court, and that the defendant had not advanced convincing grounds
to support his motion for the withdrawal of his plea of guilty. The court
pointed up the essence of defendant's argument thus: "I admit that I am
guilty and that I pleaded guilty voluntarily. However, since then, I discovered that if I had not pleaded guilty the People could not have established
60
a case."
In State v. Long6' a New Jersey county court decided that the Mapp
decision should not be applied retroactively. The defendant, who was convicted on January 22, 1960, of bookmaking and keeping a gambling resort,
moved for a new trial on the grounds that (1) the Mapp decision constitutes
newly discovered evidence and (2) the Mapp decision should be given
retroactive effect. The court ruled that a subsequent decision is not newly
discovered evidence. Further, in light of Justice Clark's footnote in the
Mapp decision concerning state procedural requirements governing challenges to criminal prosecutions, the court held that the defendant's motion
must be denied on the ground that he failed to make a timely motion
pursuant to a New Jersey rule of court. The court added: "Though the
question of application of Mapp need not be decided in light of the defendant's failure to make timely objection, this court nevertheless finds that Mapp
'62
should not be applied retroactively.
Six days after the decision in the Long case, the Superior Court of
New Jersey decided State v. Masi.63 The matter came before the court upon
a motion by the defendant to suppress evidence seized by detectives without
a search warrant. Oral testimony was taken upon the hearing of the motion
to suppress prior to the decision of the United States Supreme Court in
60.

Id. at -,

216 N.Y.S.2d at 792.

61. - N.J. -, 177 A.2d 609 (1962).
62. Id. at -, 177 A.2d at 610. The court in arriving at its decision seized upon
the language of Justice Clark, in the Mapp opinion, to the effect that "we can no longer
permit that right to remain an empty promise. . . .we can no longer permit it to be
revocable at the whim of any police officer." Ibid. (Emphasis the court's.) This, the
court reasoned, indicated "that the rule of Mapp should be applied prospectively." Ibid.
A careful reading of the pertinent area of the Mapp opinion will disclose that the
Supreme Court was speaking there in terms of individual constitutional rights, rather
than of prospective application of its decision. Further, the court felt that the retroactivity question did not have to be resolved because the defendant had failed to make
a timely objection at the time of his trial. It noted, however, that "the evidence
obtained from the search and seizure complained of, was legally admissible at that
time." State v. Long, supra note 61, at -, 177 A.2d at 611. It would seem inconsistent
to conclude that one should have objected to a procedure which at the time was fully
recognized by the courts. See pp. 284-86 infra.
63. -

N.J. Super. -,

177 A.2d 773 (Law Div. 1962).
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Mapp v. Ohio. 4 After some discussion the court decided that the evidence
had been obtained illegally, and proceeded to discuss the issue of prospective
application versus retrospective application in light of the Mapp doctrine.
The prosecutor argued that even if the search and seizure were unreasonable
under Mapp the evidence should not be suppressed. He asserted that the
Mapp doctrine should only be applied prospectively. To this the court said:
The United States Supreme Court held that the evidence seized
should be suppressed and the conviction was reversed. Their
decision was retrospectively applied in that case. This court is
bound to apply the rule of Mapp v. Ohio to every case in which
the issue is properly raised. .

.

. The case must be decided upon

the basis of the law as it presently exists, in spite of the fact that
the law was otherwise at the time of the seizure. 65 (Emphasis
added.)
People ex rel. White v. La Vallee66 involved a prisoner's application
for a writ of habeas corpus seeking release from a sentence imposed on
October 8, 1957. At that time he had pleaded guilty to a charge of possession of narcotics. Petitioner contended that his conviction was illegal
because the heroin, for the possession of which he had been indicted, had been
illegally seized. The petitioner relied heavily upon Mapp, contending that
even though he had originally pleaded guilty he could not have waived a
constitutional right. The court stated: "I believe that the objection which
defendant may have had to the use of such evidence against him could have
been and was waived by the plea of guilty .... -67 The court further decided
that since a writ of habeas corpus goes to the jurisdiction of the court, it
would not lie in the instance. Petitioner's remedy, if any, the court concluded, should be by way of an application in the nature of a writ of error
coram nobis. In dealing with retroactivity, the court observed:
Although the rule expressed in the Mapp case may apply to
appeals presently pending in our appellate courts from convictions
obtained prior to that decision, I would hesitate to apply it to a
conviction obtained in the year 1957, at which time the well-recognized rule of evidence was to the contrary .... 68
The New York Court of Appeals considered the question of retroactivity
in People v. Loria.6 9 The defendant was convicted of violating the narcotic
laws, and his conviction was affirmed by the Appellate Division. Relying upon
the Mapp decision, defendant took an appeal to the highest court of New
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

367 U.S. 643 (1961).
Supra note 63, at -, 177 A.2d at 776.
- Misc. 2d -, 223 N.Y.S.2d 135 (Sup. Ct. Clinton Cty. 1961).
Id. at - 223 N.Y.S.2d at 136.
Id. at - 223 N.Y.S.2d at 137.
10 N.Y.2d 368, 223 N.Y.S.2d 462 (1961).
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York. In discussing the applicability of the Mapp decision on the state court
level, the court declared:
There can be no doubt that it is the duty of State courts to
follow the Mapp holding in all trials taking place after June 19, 1961.
However, whether we are commanded to, and if not whether we
should, apply it in pending appeals . . . where, as here, the trial

was completed and an intermediate appellate court has affirmed
before Mapp was decided, is a threshold question in this case.
To do so would likely result in the reversal of many convictions
in pending cases ....

70

The court held that "the Mapp rule is to be applied in our review of pending
appeals from pre-Mapp convictions."' 71 Finding that the narcotics introduced
into evidence at defendant's trial were obtained as the result of an illegal
72
search and seizure, the court reversed and remanded for a new trial.
In addition to the Mapp setting, the question of whether retroactive
effect should be given to developing constitutional rights may present itself
in other areas in the future. For example, the Court may decide cases in
the next few years relating to right to counsel, double jeopardy, juvenile
defendants, and sentencing. Confusion in the lower federal and state courts
will again ensue unless the question of retroactivity is faced and answered.
ANALYSIS

Unfortunately, the area of retroactivity is one which has lent itself to
the vice of generalization. Much unnecessary confusion has thus been
engendered. In order to avoid that pitfall, the writers, in pointing up the
development of retroactivity by the Supreme Court in recent years-by way
of Griffin and Eskridge-have made a concerted effort to be meticulous in
setting forth the precise language of the Court. In light of that development,
it is the writers' view that the problem of retroactivity is an illusory one. In
the area of newly enunciated constitutional rights-such as that epitomized
by the Mapp decision-the "time" factor should play no part. The following
hypotheticals, if carefully analyzed and studied in light of the earlier-described
development of retroactivity, will demonstrate the view of the writers that
the only sensible course of action is that Mapp relief should be made available to pre-Mapp prisoners. That the Supreme Court will adopt this course
70. Id. at -, 223 N.Y.S.2d at 464.
71. Id. at -, 223 N.Y.S.2d at 465.
72. In the case of Hall v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary, supra note 6, the
court expressly acknowledged the impossibility of ascertaining the intention of the
Supreme Court in Mapp regarding retroactivity. However, after noting that no case
had been cited or found holding that pre-Mapp prisoners were entitled to the benefits
of Mapp, the court concluded that "such extreme construction appears unwarranted."
Id. at -. The opinion, similar to that in State v. Long, supra note 61, also relied, inter alia,
upon terminology such as "no longer" in Mapp.
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of action is evidenced by the position it took in Eskridge. It is important
to emphasize that this course of action does not mean necessarily that
"retroactive" effect is being given to Mapp. For, as in Eskridge, the earlierconvicted prisoner might very well be using the new decision simply as
useful precedent. It is in this sense that the problem of retroactivity is
regarded by the writers as only a mirage.
(1) Mr. E, convicted of murder and sentenced in the X State
Court in'1935 to life imprisonment, could not afford to purchase
a transcript and hence was unable to take an appeal. In 1958, he
petitioned the X State Court for habeas corpus, urging that the
denial of a free transcript violated the fourteenth amendment. Upon
dismissal of his petition, the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari and held that a violation of the fourteenth amendment had
been demonstrated. Accordingly, it reversed and remanded with a
direction that Mr. E be given a free transcript for the purpose of
taking his appeal.
(2) Mr. E, convicted in the X State Court in 1935 and
sentenced to life imprisonment, was unable to afford an appeal. In
1956, in the Y State Court, Mr. G, who had been convicted of robbery and sentenced to ten years, was unable, because of indigence,
to purchase the required transcript in order to take an appeal. By
way of a post-conviction remedy available in State Y, Mr. G urged
that the denial of a free transcript violated the fourteenth amendment. After the highest court in State Y affirmed a dismissal of the
petition, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and
held that Mr. G's rights under the fourteenth amendment had been
violated. Accordingly, it reversed and remanded. In 1958, Mr. E,
by habeas corpus, petitioned the X State Court, urging that the
denial of a free transcript violated his rights under the fourteenth
amendment. The dismissal was affirmed by the highest court of State
X and certiorari was granted by the United States Supreme Court.
Suppose that the United States Supreme Court denied relief to Mr. E,
in the second hypothetical, on the ground that it was opposed to giving
retroactive effect to the G decision. Would this be sound in light of the
fact that if the G case had not been decided in 1956, Mr. E, as in the first
hypothetical, would have succeeded? Should relief to Mr. E turn on whether
he was able to win the race to the United States Supreme Court? Further,
would it not seem that with the G decision as a precedent, Mr. E's rights
should be stronger and more certain? Or, should Mr. E be prejudiced by
the fact that Mr. G happened to outrace him to the court?
Should Mr. E, in the second hypothetical, in order to avoid a "retroactivity" problem, claim that he does not want the G decision to be applied
directly to his case, and urge that the Court use it (the G case) only for
purposes of guidance? In other words, would not Mr. E be well advised to
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argue that the G case is different from his, but similar enough for the Court
to use it as helpful precedent? Indeed, in order to be certain that no "retroactive" controversy is stirred up, might not Mr. E be inclined in his brief
and argument to omit any mention of the G decision? Should the problem of
the "race to the courthouse" be compounded by the labels that might be
assigned to the runners?
Suppose that the United States Supreme Court, anticipating, and
seeking to avoid, some of the problems raised by the above questions, ruled
in the G case that its decision was applicable only to future convictions (thus
excluding Mr. G himself from relief). Clearly, then, neither G nor E, in
the second hypothetical, would be entitled to relief. Would this approach
be sound? Would it not fail to encourage prisoners to vindicate their constitutional rights? Since, of course, the Court requires a "controversy" in
order to act, would not this discouragement stand in the way of constitutional
progress ?
Variations of the foregoing hypotheticals may be helpful in comprehending
the view of the writers:
(3) Mr. E was convicted in 1935 in the X State Court. In
1958, he reached the United States Supreme Court and obtained a
determination that his rights under the fourteenth amendment had
been violated. Mr. G, who had been convicted in 1956 in the Y State
Court, reached the United States Supreme Court in 1959.
Should Mr. G be denied relief on the ground that this would be a retroactive application of the E decision?
(4) Mr. E had been convicted in 1935 in the X State Court.
Mr. G had been convicted in 1935 in the Y State Court. In 1956,
Mr. G reached the United States Supreme Court which held that
the fourteenth amendment had been violated. In 1958, Mr. E
reached the United States Supreme Court.
Should the Court deny relief to Mr. E (convicted in the same year as
Mr. G) on the ground that it is opposed to giving retroactive effect to the
G decision? Would the result be different if the parties had been convicted
in the same state court, but in separate trials, in 1935? Would it be different if they had been convicted on the same day in 1935 ? On the other
hand, suppose Mr. E had reached the United States Supreme Court before
Mr. G?
To illustrate more sharply the writers' position in the Mapp setting,
keeping in mind the Griffin-Eskridge hypotheticals just described, the following situations may be considered:
(1) Mrs. P, convicted in the X State Court in 1935 on the basis
of evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure,
reached the United States Supreme Court in 1961. The Court, not
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having previously dealt with this question, held for the first time
that this use of evidence constituted a violation of the fourteenth
amendment. Accordingly, it reversed and remanded.
(2) Mrs. P was convicted in the X State Court in 1935 as a
result of the admission of illegally seized evidence. Mrs. M, convicted in 1961 in the Y State Court on the basis of illegally obtained
evidence, appealed, and ultimately reached the United States Supreme Court later in the same year. The Court, speaking for the
first time on the subject, held that the fourteenth amendment had
been violated. In 1962, Mrs. P reached the United States Supreme
Court.
(3) Mrs. W, convicted in the X State Court in 1949 on the basis
of illegally obtained evidence, reached the United States Supreme
Court. It held that the use of such evidence in a state court was not
a violation of the fourteenth amendment. Mrs. M, convicted in
the Y State Court in 1961 as a result of illegally seized evidence,
reached the United States Supreme Court later in the same year.
The Court held that the use of such evidence violated the fourteenth
amendment and expressly overruled the W decision. In 1962, Mrs.
W again reached the United States Supreme Court and asked for
relief similar to that accorded Mrs. M.
(4) Mrs. W, convicted in a state court in 1949, appealed and
ultimately the United States Supreme Court held that the fourteenth
amendment had not been violated. In 1955, Mrs. C (a friend of
Mrs. W) was likewise convicted on the basis of illegally obtained
evidence and sent to prison. Mrs. M, convicted in 1961, reached the
United States Supreme Court which held that the use of such
evidence violated the fourteenth amendment. In 1962, Mrs. C
reached the United States Supreme Court and asked for similar
relief.
(5) Mrs. D was convicted in 1953 and went to prison for a
twenty-year term. In 1959, Mrs. M was convicted, sentenced to
ten years, and became a cellmate of Mrs. D. In 1961, Mrs. M
reached the United States Supreme Court, which held that her rights
under the fourteenth amendment had been violated. Her cellmate,
Mrs. D, in 1962, reached the United States Supreme Court and asked
for similar relief.
(6) Assume the same facts as in hypothetical (5) except that,
in 1961, Mrs. D (rather than Mrs. M) reached the United States
Supreme Court and obtained the ruling that enunciated the new
constitutional concept. In 1964, Mrs. M reached the United States
Supreme Court and asked for similar relief.
One other hypothetical along a slightly different vein may serve to illustrate
the curious consequences that might ensue if retroactivity were regarded
as a serious problem:
(7) Mrs. C committed a crime in 1958. Mrs. D also committed
a crime during the same year. Mrs. C, in 1959, feeling that she
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should discharge her debt to society, surrendered to the police, was
tried and convicted on the basis of illegally seized evidence. Mrs.
M, who committed a crime in 1961, was tried and convicted
as a result of illegally obtained evidence. She reached the United
States Supreme Court which held that the fourteenth amendment
had been violated. Mrs. D, who had long eluded the police, was
finally apprehended in 1962.
Should Mrs. C, who surrendered and was convicted before the M decision,
be denied the new constitutional right; whereas, Mrs. D, who avoided apprehension until after the M decision, receives the benefit of the new right?
While a careful study of the hypotheticals themselves may serve to
indicate to the reader the only sensible approach that can be taken to the
problem of "retroactivity," it may be well to emphasize briefly their import.
This problem, in the opinion of the writers, should present no monstrous
obstacle to a court. "Retroactvity" has become a terminological mirage
which vanishes when confronted by the acid test of careful analysis. Where
a prisoner, several years after his conviction, has urged that he had been
deprived of a constitutional right, the courts invariably have been sympathetic
to his plight. Generally, they have permitted him to obtain relief even though
this may entail the birth of a new constitutional right. Certainly, if, in the
interim, the Supreme Court has had occasion to confer the new constitutional right upon another, the prisoner should not be prejudiced by that
decision. If anything, it should strengthen his position because he now has
Supreme Court precedent upon which to rely. It is ludicrous to place the
granting or withholding of a constitutional protection under the pivotal
inquiry: "Which prisoner has won the race to the courthouse?"73
WAIVER

Some may urge that the bar of waiver precludes the assertion of a
constitutional right years later. Placing the waiver theory in the setting of
a key hypothetical, it might be contended that a party convicted in 1935
should not be permitted to assert, for the first time, a denial of his constitutional rights in 1958. It would not seem, however, that the withholding
73. It is clear that, for purposes of considering retroactivity, Mapp and Gri.fin are
substantially the same. In both Mapp and Griffin (and Eskridge), a new right under
the fourteenth amendment had been espoused by the United States Supreme Court.
It would appear to be incidental only, and a distinction without substance, that Mapp
overruled an earlier decision. For, so far as a given prisoner is concerned, why should
it matter that the Supreme Court at an earlier time had spoken or had not spoken?
Were it otherwise, a pre-Wolf prisoner would be treated more favorably than a postWolf (but pre-Mapp) prisoner. And, in the Griffin setting, had the Supreme Court
held (say in 1945) that an indigent could be denied a right to appeal, would the
Eskridge case have been decided differently? Just as a race to the courthouse should
not be determinative of an individual's constitutional rights, so also a prior running on
the same track should not be determinative.
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of constitutional protection should turn on the "passage of time." Indeed,

in several cases, delay has not been viewed by the Court as a bar. Pennsylvania
ex rel. Herman v. Claudy74 is illustrative of that approach. There, the
petitioner, in a Pennsylvania court in 1945, pleaded guilty to various charges
sounding in theft and was sentenced to 17Y to 35 years in the penitentiary.
In 1953, some eight years later, he petitioned for habeas corpus in the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, urging that his conviction should be invalidated
as in violation of the fourteenth amendment. He asserted: "(1) that his
pleas of guilty were the result of coercion and threats by state officers and
(2) that at no stage of the proceedings was he either advised of his right
to or given the benefit of counsel." 7 5
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. In its brief before
the Court, the state argued that the petitioner was "guilty of laches by
76
filing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus about 82 years after sentence."
It further contended that "a judgment of conviction by a court carried with
it a presumption of regularity. The longer the judgment of conviction
stands, the stronger the presumption of regularity becomes.

' 77

Rejecting

the state's position, the Supreme Court found that "under the allegations
here petitioner is entitled to relief if he can prove his charges. 78 Accordingly,
in reversing, it directed that petitioner be granted a hearing. In reaching this
result, a unanimous Supreme Court had this to say:
In Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437 . . . where the facts

were strikingly similar to those presented here, we held that representation by counsel was required by the Due Process Clause. Nor
was petitioner barred from presenting his challenge to the conviction
because 8 years had passed before this action was commenced.
Uveges did not challenge his conviction for 7 years .

. .

. And in a

later case we held that a prisoner could challenge the validity of
his conviction 18 years after he had been convicted. Palmer v. Ashe,
342 U.S. 134 .

. .

. The sound premise upon which these holdings

rested is that men incarcerated in flagrant violation of their constitutional rights have a remedy.79 (Emphasis added.)
It is noteworthy that in the Eskridge case the Supreme Court was apparently
not troubled by the bar of waiver. For, in 1958, it saw fit to apply a newly
enunciated constitutional concept to a 1935 conviction.80
74. 350 U.S. 116 (1956).
75. Id. at 117.
76. Brief for Respondent, p. -, Pennsylvania ex rel. Herman v. Claudy, supra
note 74 (100 L. Ed. at 128).
77. Ibid.
78. Pennsylvania ex rel. Herman v. Claudy, supra note 74, at 123.
79. Ibid. See also Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155 (1957). Further, it should
be recognized that prisoners, in many cases, do not have access to law books in order
to determine whether or not their rights may have been violated.
80. In addition to the above discussion on waiver, it may be pointed out that a
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There is, of course, another sense in which the term "waiver" may be
employed: a prisoner who would seek to take advantage *f a newly enunciated
constitutional protection would be barred by his failure to take appropriate
objection at the time of his earlier trial and conviction. For example, a man
convicted in 1955 on the basis of illegally obtained evidence in a state where
such evidence is admissible, might, after becoming apprised of the Mapp
decision, seek relief. At that time, the state might argue that he is barred
because he failed at his trial to object to the tainted evidence.
Certainly, this waiver argument falls when subjected to realistic appraisal. In light of the Wolf decision of 1949-which permitted a state to
admit tainted evidence in a criminal proceeding-the issue of the illegality
of the search and seizure would have been entirely irrelevant in the 1955
trial. That being so, competent counsel would have no occasion to offer an
objection. Indeed, were he to do so, it might be considered detrimental to
his client's interests, for the trial judge may regard the objection as frivolous,
unwarranted, unduly time-consuming and temerous, and the jurors themselves may become impatient and perhaps antagonistic. Since, then, such
an objection would be not only futile but also, perhaps, hurtful, it would be
incredible to hold that a defendant seeking Mapp relief should be deemed to
have effected a waiver by virtue of his failure to make such an objection.
Indeed, it would appear that a pre-Wolf defendant, under a parity of
reasoning, should also not be required to make such an objection. This
rejection of a waiver argument would also seem to be supported by language
of Justice Frankfurter in the Griffin case, where he said:
Candor compels the further acknowledgment that it would not
be unreasonable for all indigent defendants, now incarcerated, who
at the time were unable to pay for transcripts of proceedings in
trial courts, to urge that they were justified in assuming that such
a restriction upon criminal appeals in Illinois was presumably a
valid exercise of the State's power at the time when they suffered
its consequences. Therefore it could well be claimed that thereby
any conscious waiver of a constitutional right is negatived.8 '
POLICY

CONSIDERATIONS

In order to appraise intelligently the operation and impact of retroactivity in the area of newly enunciated constitutional rights of the individual,
a number of policy considerations should be recognized. The Mapp situation
affords a contemporary and typical setting which will be pursued for purposes
prisoner should not be prejudiced by his failure to take an appeal earlier since it may
have seemed futile under existing law or his counsel may not have been acute enough
to recognize the potential possibility of persuading the court of an expanded consti-

tutional right.
81. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 25 (1956).
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of illustration. It is recent, having been decided in 1961. It is typical, in that
a new constitutional concept under the fourteenth amendment is involved.
Administrative Inconvenience
If retroactive effect were to be given, some might argue that great stress
would thereby be placed upon existing judicial machinery. 82 Innumerable
hearings would have to be held, crowded court calendars would become more
crowded, and re-prosecution would be necessary in some instances.88
Difficult as this may seem, it would be a sad day when mere expense and
inconvenience were allowed to prevail over personal liberty. Further, it may
well be that the hue and cry of the "inconvenience" has been exaggerated. 84
For example, the State of Illinois, in providing appropriate procedures for
85
pre-Griffin prisoners, has demonstrated that a retroactive plan is feasible.
Protection of Society
It is generally acknowledged that the criminal law exists to protect
society. Hence,. broadly speaking, if one, by committing a crime, has
demonstrated that he is a menace to the community, his incarceration is
deemed warranted. Upon the expiration of his sentence, in theory at least,
he is no longer to be regarded as a menace. Some may urge, therefore, that
if retroactive effect were given, the release of prisoners before their time
would be inimical to the interests of the community. 86 In this connection it is
82. See Morris, supra note 42, at 432.
83. See pp. 296-98 infra.
84. Morris, supra note 42, at 433.
85. Note, Effect of Overruling Prior Judgments on Constitutional Issues, 43 VA.
L. REV. 1279, 1293 (1957); Note, The Effect of Griffin v. Illinois on the States' Administration of the Criminal Law, 25 U. Cm. L. REV. 161 (1957).
86. In Commonwealth ex rel. McGlenn v. Smith, 344 Pa. 41, 24 A.2d 1 (1942),
the petitioner, serving a 10 to 20 year prison sentence for robbery, urged, by way of a
writ of habeas corpus, that he was being unlawfully detained because at his trial he
had not been accorded the right to counsel. In discussing the writ the court said:
If this petition presents a case of "apparent need for" the "extraordinary
remedy" of habeas corpus, it is reasonable to expect that our courts will soon
be flooded with like petitions. In this State during the years 1939-1940 there
were in our criminal courts 37,221 pleas of guilty, 10,755 convictions in which
a jury trial was waived, and 6,104 convictions after a jury trial. In the same
period there were 3,703 defendants sentenced to state prisons or reformatories
and 18,449 sentenced to local jails. If even 20% of the defendants who are here
annually sentenced to prison were "without benefit of counsel" and seek their
discharge by writs of habeas corpus issuing out of the appellate courts, these
two courts will annually have to hear and dispose of 1,107 such cases. Our
courts should not for the reasons offered in this petition turn loose upon society,
the hundreds of convicts who were sent to prison after pleading guilty or
being adjudged guilty by a jury, unless the law imperatively requires them to
do so, and there is no such requirement. Id. at 51, 24 A.2d at 6.
If given prisoners are deemed entitled to their freedom on the ground that they have
been deprived of a constitutional right, it is to be remembered that it is the Constitution
(our form of government) that authorizes such relief. It is therefore no answer that
the community will be flooded with dangerous men. In any event, a "flood" would
not necessarily ensue. In order to be deemed entitled to a new constitutional right, a
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noteworthy, however, that absolute discharge of prisoners would not
necessarily ensue. It would seem, for example, that a pre-Mapp prisoner
would first have to show in an appropriate hearing that the evidence used
against him had been illegally seized and, if so, he would then have to be
87
re-tried.
Estoppel
88
In 1949, the United States Supreme Court, in Wolf v. Colorado,
held that the admission in a state court of illegally obtained evidence was
not a violation of the fourteenth amendment. Relying upon the Wolf decision, some prosecutors in states where such tainted evidence was considered
admissible might well have utilized this evidence rather than other available
untainted evidence. Indeed, some prosecutors may have felt it unnecessary
even to spend additional time and resources searching for other evidence.
If retroactive effect were given to the Mapp decision, it might, because of
the passage of time, render it difficult or impossible to secure this former
evidence.8 9 Hence, some states might argue that in light of its pronouncement
in Wolf, the United States Supreme Court should now be estopped from
giving retroactive effect to Mapp. Curiously, if this argument were accepted,
retroactive effect would be given to pre-Wolf prisoners but not to those
convicted after Wolf. In any event, the validity of this estoppel theory
becomes questionable when it is recognized that the real effect is not to visit
hurt upon the Supreme Court, but rather to detach prisoners, who had
nothing to do with the Wolf decision, from their constitutional rights. 90

prisoner would have to establish that he was deprived of such a right and, if the
showing is made, a new trial would ordinarily ensue.
87. See pp. 296-98 infra.

88. 338 'U.S.25 (1949).
89. Cf. Commonwealth ex rel. Murray v. Keenan, 186 Pa. Super. 107, 109,
140 A.2d 361, '362 (1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 868 (1958), where the court said:
A writ-of habeas corpus is not a substitute for an appeal, or for a writ of
error, or 'for a motion for a new trial, or for the correction of trial errors.
[This rule] . . . is not only designed to bring about orderly practice in the
courts (although it does this), but it is also designed to promote justice by
requiring that the trial be examined for errors within a time when witnesses
and partidipants in the trial are available, and their recollections of both the
trial and the offense charged are not dimmed by the passing of time. An
accused should not be allowed to wait until the Commonwealth's witnesses
have vanished or become ineffective through fading memories before challenging
the fairness .of his trial.
Of course, tie passage of time may also operate against the accused. See pp. 296-97
infra. Also, such "waiting" in prison seems to be unrealistic.
90. It should be noted that an illegal "seizure," as of and after the Wolf decision
was considered a violation of the fourteenth amendment. The state which has violated
a provision of the Constitution should not be heard to assert that estoppel should be
visited upon andther court. One who would ask for consideration in the way of
estoppel should have "clean hands." In any event, it would seem that prosecutors, who
are charged with upholding the law, should not utilize such evidence.
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Liberty and Equality
In the system of government that prevails in this country, the high value
placed upon individual liberty should not be minimized. Indeed, the underlying philosophy is that the government exists for the individual-not the
individual for the government. 91 Hence, it is of the utmost importance that
the individual enjoy all of the fruits of liberty irrespective of the time when
they may ripen. The giving of retroactive effect to newly enunciated constitutional concepts would certainly be in line with this basic philosophy.
Another fundamental concept that is built into the American system of
government is that all persons shall have equal rights under the Constitutionboth in principle and in the enjoyment of their benefits. Consistency with
this principle would seem to demand that the factor of "time" should have
no bearing. The following example is illustrative: A is convicted one year
before a decision espousing a new constitutional right. B is convicted one
day before this decision. C is placed on trial one day after the decision. If
retroactive effect is not given, C would enjoy the expanded constitutional
right but A would not. B might enjoy it if the Court holds that the new
decision is applicable because his appeal was pending at the time of the
decision, or he may not receive its benefit if the Court holds that the time
of trial is the determinative factor. Thus, individuals, separated quite
fortuitously by only a few hours, days or months, would have very different,
and unequal, constitutional rights. Such an inequality would be magnified on
a "geographical" basis since, in the absence of a Supreme Court requirement,
92
some states might choose to give retroactive effect while others might refuse.
Federal-State Relationship
If the United States Supreme Court were to require that retroactive
effect be given to Mapp, some might urge that this constituted an interference with the function of the states. For example, the four dissenting
Justices in Griffin felt that a requirement of retroactivity would be "an interference with state power for what may be a desirable result, but which we
believe to be within the field of local option."'93 Along a similar vein, the
State of Washington, in Eskridge, argued in its brief that a requirement of
retroactivity would be violative of the tenth amendment which reserves to
the states all undelegated powers. 94 A majority of the Supreme Court,
91. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (concurring opinion).
92. In light of the extreme inequality on both a "time" and "geographical" basis
and the arbitrary and capricious results (see pp. 280-84 supra) created by a failure
to apply newly enunciated constitutional rights to past factual settings, such a failure
would seem inconsistent with the concept of equal protection.
93. Griffin v. Illinois, supra note 81, at 29.
94. Brief for Respondent, pp. 19, 20, Eskridge v. Washington State Bd. of

Prison Terms & Paroles, 357 U.S. 214 (1958).
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however, in both cases was apparently not troubled by such an argument.
While traditionally the area of criminal law enforcement has been left mainly
in the sphere of state control, the Supreme Court has given effect to personal
95
constitutional rights arising out of that field, without serious difficulty.
If this federal power were not available, rights under the Constitution would
become empty forms. Granted, a healthy balance ought to be struck between
federal and state power; however, the maintenance of the balance should
never require as its price the denial of an individual's constitutional rights.
While this area of the law is an evolving one, it would seem clear that the
Court in recent times has taken cognizance of the great interests of the
individual.9 6
Incentive
It is noteworthy that a requirement of retroactivity may have another
salutary effect. Were the Supreme Court to adopt a practice of retroactivity
in the area of personal constitutional rights, states might be encouraged in
advance of the event to give fuller expression to such rights. Thus, since
individual rights would be promoted on both a state and federal level
contemporaneously, the Bill of Rights would thereby become a more effective
and meaningful instrument.
Thus it would appear that in the area of personal constitutional rights,
"policy" itself dictates that new decisions-such as Mapp-should be applied
97
to prior cases by the courts.
COMPARATIVE AREAS

It may be well to look briefly at the manner in which courts have treated
retroactivity in other areas of the law. 98 Several significant considerations
95. See note 85 supra.
96. See note 3 supra. The Mapp decision itself indicates a shift of emphasis by
the Court. In Wolf v. Colorado, supra note 88, the Court, noting the experience and
interest of the states, relegated individual constitutional rights to the realm of state
protection. An apparent shift of emphasis, however, culminating in the Mapp case,
has taken place and the majority of the Court has shown greater concern with individual
rights and less with assertions that the federal-state relationship will be strained. The
precise impact of this shift on various aspects of constitutional rights is one which
will become more clear, however, only through further case development.
97. While there is little authority or writing on the subject, it appears that
courts have the inherent power to give retroactive effect to a decision or to limit it
to the future. Griffin v. Illinois, supra note 81 (concurring opinion) ; Great Northern
Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358 (1932). See generally, Arkadelphia
Milling Co. v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry., 249 U.S. 134, 146 (1918); Northwestern
Fuel Co. v. Brock, 139 U.S. 216, 219 (1890) ; Gumbel v. Pitkin, 124 U.S. 131, 145
(1887); Krippendorf v. Hyde, 110 U.S. 276, 283 (1883). It should, however, be noted
that considerations of "equal protection" may have some bearing on this "choice." See
note 92 supra.
98. Snyder, Retrospective Operation of Overruling Decisions, 35 ILL. L. REv. 121
(1940); Stimson, Retroactive Application of Law-A Problem in Constitutional Law,
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should be noted: first, the policies involved generally differ greatly from
those found in the area of personal constitutional rights; and second, even
though the policy considerations in the comparative areas differ, the courts,
in deciding whether to give retroactive effect, have generally acted in a
manner consistent with the protection of the individual.
In situations involving contract or property rights, the courts do not
usually give retroactive effect to their new interpretations of the law. 99
Such a policy is a sound one, since retroactivity here would serve to "clog
business transactions"' ° and "unsettle titles."''1 The business community
needs stability and a set of standards upon which reliance may be placed.
Courts, in dealing with these cases, have frequently observed that to give
retroactive effect here would be violative of fundamental "principles of
justice."'10 2 Clearly, the policies centering around reliance and business
certainly are not the same as those involved in the area of personal constitutional rights.
In the area of criminal law, a distinction should be noted between new
decisions which, if applied retroactively, would operate to the detriment of
a given accused, and those which would confer a benefit. In the former
situation, the courts generally refuse to accord retroactive effect.' 03 As one
court has aptly stated:
We think that a change of decisions involving the interpretation of
criminal statutes should have a prospective effect .

. .

. This rule

applies the same principle as the constitutional prohibition of ex
°4
post facto legislation. It will prevent cruel and unusual punishment.
Another court has noted that respect for the law "is weakened, if men are
punished for acts which according to the general consensus of opinion they
were justified in believing to be morally right and in accordance with law."'10 5
It is noteworthy that the courts in this setting deny retroactivity in order to
protect the individual.
Where, on the other hand, a new decision, if applied retroactively, would
38 MICH. L. REV. 30 (1939) ; Seeman, The Retroactive Effect of Repeal Legislation,
27 Ky. L.J. 75 (1938); Smead, The Rule Against Retroactive Legislation: A Basic
Principle of Jurisprudence, 20 MINN. L. REV. 775 (1936) ; Ballard, Retroactive Federal
Taxation, 48 HARV. L. REV. 592 (1935) ; von Moschzisker, Stare Decisis in Courts of
Last Resort, 37 HAV. L. REV. 409 (1924) ; Freeman, Retroactive Operation of Decisions,
18 COLUM. L. REV. 230 (1918) ; Smith, RetrOactive Income Taxation, 33 YALE L.J. 35
(1923) ; Notes, 43 VA. L. REV. 1279 (1957), 60 HARV. L. REV. 437 (1947), 47 HARV.
L. REV. 1403 (1934).
99. Snyder, supra note 98, at 131.
100. Id. at 140.
101. Ibid.
102. Ibid.
103. Snyder, supra note 98, at 131.
104. State v. Longino, 109 Miss. 125, -, 67 So. 902, 903 (1915).
105. State v. O'Neil, 147 Iowa 527, -, 126 N.W. 454, 456 (1910).
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confer a benefit upon an individual, different policy considerations are
present. As a Pennsylvania court has said, in giving retroactive effect to a
criminal law theory:
When our court inadvertently promulgates law, which at a later
date they or the appellate courts consider to be unfair, unjust or improper, the courts have the power to correct their earlier error. In
releasing petitioner, we believe error is being corrected. We feel
strongly that the responsibility of our courts should not end with
the conviction and sentencing of criminal offenders, thereafter
ignoring circumstances and facts that would indicate a different
sentence, or as in this case, no sentence, should have been imposed. 10 6
Since the above reasoning is consistent with basic principles of liberty and
equality and takes cognizance of the individual's interest, the approach is a
sound one. 107
However, there are other decisions in the same area which have refused
to give retroactivity. Warring v. Colpoys'0 8 is typical of this line of cases.' 0 9
There, a Circuit Court of Appeals refused to give retroactive effect to a
United States Supreme Court decision1 10 which interpreted a contempt statute
differently than the court that had earlier convicted Warring. The Circuit
Court of Appeals, holding that the prisoner was "not entitled to discharge
upon the habeas corpus writ,""' rejected "the idea that if a court was
considered to have the power in 1939 to do a certain thing under existing
statutory construction and that construction is changed so that it no longer
has the power to do that thing, it should be concluded that it never had the
power in 1939."112 A more sensible approach, in the opinion of the writers,
could have been taken. The District Court had the power at the time to
convict on the basis of its interpretation of the statute. A subsequent United
States Supreme Court decision demonstrated that it had erred. Hence,
106. Commonwealth ex rel. Leaks v. Myers, 139 Legal Intell. No. 55, p. 1, col. 1
(Phila. C.P., Sept. 8, 1958). See Notes, 20 U. PiTT. L. REV. 703 (1959); 2 STAN.
L. REV. 769 (1959).
107. It should be noted, however, that a recent Pennsylvania Supreme Court
decision, Commonwealth ex rel. Hough v. Maroney, 402 Pa. 262, 168 A.2d 732 (1961),
without assigning any reason, appears to have denied retroactive effect in a setting
similar to that of the Leaks case.
108. 122 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 678 (1941).
109. See Meyers v. United States, 181 F.2d 802 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (dictum), cert.
denied, 339 U.S. 983 (1950) ; Meyers v. Welch, 179 F.2d 707 (4th Cir. 1950) (dictum) ;
State ex rel. Gosnell v. Edwards, 198 Tenn. 83, 277 S.W.2d 444 (1955); accord,
United States v. Gandia, 255 F.2d 454 (2d Cir. 1958); Collins v. Webb, 133 F. Supp.
877 (N.D. Cal. 1955).
110. Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33 (1941). Indeed, in this case the Court
noted that a geographical interpretation should be placed on a statute in order to
effect clarity.
111. Warring v. Colpoys, supra note 108.
112. Ibid.
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imprisonment was no longer justified. Apparently feeling itself caught in
the abstract dilemma relating to court "power" and bound to a narrow view
of the relief obtainable by habeas corpus, the Circuit Court of Appeals failed
to look at the practical result. Despite the fact that a person was in prison
who should not have been under its own interpretation of the contempt
statute, the Supreme Court failed to grant certiorari. 113 The injustice of
Warring v. Colpoys" 4 is obvious, and the case merits no further comment.
Along similar lines, the famous Durham"-'case also precluded retroactive
effect. In this case, however, the court in its opinion setting forth the new
criminal law concept relating to insanity limited it to prospective application.",
This limitation was apparently designed to prevent any administrative inconvenience which might be caused by requests for relief from prisoners convicted under the old standard. 1 7 Yet if the new standard was an enlightened
one that was more in accord with reality, it would seem that all persons
should benefit from it. Indeed, some persons may be serving sentences who
were "insane" at the time they committed crimes under the tests subsequently
developed. As indicated previously, policies of liberty and equality far outweigh the often-exaggerated considerations of administrative inconvenience." S
While considerations relating to the finality of judgments or res judicata
seem important in the civil area where disputes must be settled and predictability must be attained, they should not be significant in the area of
criminal law.' 19 The only finality which would seem to be promoted would
be that of the prison records and routine. Nevertheless, it should be pointed
out that changing criminal law concepts differ from constitutional rights,
and are left more in the sphere of state control.
Before leaving the comparative area, it may be well to note that some
judges have applied cases or situations involving retroactivity in one area
to others without recognizing that the policy considerations differ.120 For
example, Justice Frankfurter in his concurring opinion in the Griffin case,
supported his argument for limiting the decision prospectively by pointing
out that "more than a hundred years ago . .. the Supreme Court of Ohio,
confronted with a problem not unlike the one before us, found no difficulty
in doing so when it concluded that legislative divorces were unconstitu113. 314 U.S. 678 (1941).
114. Supra note 108.
115. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
116. Ibid.
117. See Notes, 43 VA. L. REV. 1279 (1957) ; 20 U. PITT. L. REV. 703 (1959).
118. See pp. 287-89 infra.
119. Of course, an exception exists where one, who has been acquitted of a crime,
should not be subjected to the fear of again being placed in jeopardy.
120. See Warring v. Colpoys, supra note 111; Griffin v. Illinois, supra note 81
(concurring opinion, Frankfurter).
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tional.' 21 The policy, however, behind such a prospective limitation is
obviously to protect those individuals who relied on the apparent legality
of legislative divorces. Indeed, to grant retroactivity in such a situation
would create problems of void second marriages and illegitimacy. Clearly,
these policy considerations differ from those in the Griffin case. Maximum
protection of the interests of the individual in the legislative divorce context
is achieved by not permitting retroactive effect, while in the Griffin case it
is best effectuated by requiring retroactive application. Justice Frankfurter
also stated that the "sound reason"' 22 set forth by Justice Cardozo in
the case of Great Northen Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co.' 23 supported
a prospective limitation of the Griffin doctrine. It should be noted, however,
that very different policy considerations were present there. The Sunburst
case involved the question of whether new rates for shipping applied retroactively. As one commentator has pointed out, there was,
[N]otice to the parties at the time that the shipments were made that
the rates were tentative and subject to retroactive alteration. It
follows that neither party could have changed its position in reliance
upon an unalterable rate, so that the retroactive application of the
new rate was in no way unfair or unjust. 12
He also noted that if the rate had not been tentative and a new rate were
applied it would have been unjust. 125 Thus, in Sunburst, policies which affect

the business world are involved, not the very different policies which relate
to personal constitutional rights.
An analysis of comparative areas indicates that in many cases dealing
with retroactivity, courts are concerned with protectilng the rights of the
individual-a fortiori, such concern should prevail in the area of personal
constitutional rights.
PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECTS

In appraising the problem of retroactivity, some may be inclined to look
at it from a philosophical viewpoint. "Natural Law" adherents, for example,
believing that the courts merely "discover" what has always been the law,
would feel that retroactive effect should be given to constitutional rights as
and when discovered.126 Those tending toward the "positivistic" school, on
the other hand, viewing changes in the law as "new" law, might urge that
retroactive effect ought not to be given. 1 27 What is not often recognized, how121. Griffin v. Illinois, upra note 120.
122. Ibid.
123. Supra note 97.
124. Stimson, supra note 98, at 55.
125. Ibid.
126. Great Northern Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., supra note 97; Stimson,
supra note 98.
127. Ibid.
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ever, is that either philosophical position may constitute a two-edged sword.
If a newly enunciated right has always existed and is merely being discovered, it could be argued that there had been a waiver of such a right
by those who had been convicted before the new decision and are now serving
prison terms. Similarly, the sword of the positivist can cut two ways. If it
is decided that retroactivity should be accorded, it would be inconsistent
for a person of this philosophy to urge a waiver. For, since the new right
never before existed, there could have been no occasion to raise an objection
at an earlier time. Unfortunately, legal philosophy has often been far removed
from the affairs of men and hence from the "law in action." Justice Cardozo,
in discussing the problem of retroactivity and the variety of philosophies in
which courts might indulge, declared that the Supreme Court was not
concerned with "the wisdom of their philosophies, but the legality of their
acts."' 128 Justice Frankfurter, in Griffin, put it well when he remarked:
"The Court ought neither to rely on casuistic arguments in denying constitutional claims, nor deem itself imprisoned within a formal, abstract
dilemma."'-9 In the opinion of the writers the "law in action," and its real
effects upon individual human beings, is the important item to considernot how neatly given philosophies seem to work. Indeed, the great and
sobering crises of modern times have emphasized the need for flexibility in legal
0

philosophy today.13

However, for those who feel sti:ongly that philosophy should play a
part in resolving the problem of retroactivity, it is suggested that the application of newly enunciated constitutional protections to earlier fact settings is
compatible with either philosophy. Thus, if retroactivity is granted on
"natural law" grounds, it may be argued philosophically that there was no
waiver because the individual had no knowledge of, or insight into, the
"existing law" which was later discovered by an evolving and more enlightened society. Likewise, from a "positivistic" standpoint, if the law is
regarded as having been changed, it would not be inconsistent to view the
imprisonment prior to the new decision as valid (in accordance with the
law as it then existed), and to regard continued imprisonment after the
decision as illegal. In other words, a valid imprisonment may become an
illegal one as of and after the birth of a new constitutional right. 18 1
128. Great Northern Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., supra note 97, at 365.
129. Griffin v. Illinois, supra note 81, at 25.
130. Too often, legal philosophy is used as a rationalization and does not really
explain results. The Nuremberg Trials have pointed up the inadequacy of some of
the main currents of philosophical thought. See Hart, Positivism and the Separation
of Law and Morals, 71 HARY. L. REv. 593 (1958) ; Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to
Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REv. 630 (1958).
131. If it were argued that a "change in times" may have accounted for the
birth of a new constitutional right and hence one who had been convicted before that
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RELIEF

Once it has been determined that a newly enunciated constitutional
concept must be given retroactive effect, it is important to consider how this
can be accomplished. It would not, as some have feared, result in the wholesale release of prisoners. 13 2 A given prisoner at a preliminary hearing would
have to establish the denial of a constitutional right and, if he succeeded,
he would then have to be retried. The Mapp setting may be availed of for
purposes of illustration: a pre-Mapp prisoner, convicted on the basis of
alleged illegally obtained evidence would, at a preliminary hearing, have the
burden of establishing the fact of illegality. This allocation of burden would
seem necessary to prevent frivolous claims. If the transcript of his trial
was still available, he might utilize it to the extent that it might be helpful.
Unfortunately, however, this may accord him little aid, since the question of
the legality of the seizure would have been entirely irrelevant at the time of
his trial. Further, it may well be that the former prosecutor is no longer in
office and is not now available, and the officers who participated in the arrest
and seizure of the evidence, likewise, may no longer be available. Even
if they are available, their memories may have faded or their obvious interest
may color their testimony. In light of these practical difficulties, it would not
be unfair to require the state to assist the prisoner in whatever respects
that it can-such as free and easy access to records. If, at this hearing, then,
the prisoner is unable to make a satisfactory showing of the fact of illegality,
he of course would be returned to prison. If he sustains the burden, a new
trial would have to follow. In fairness to the state, in light of the passage
of time, the transcript of the first trial should be available for use in this
new trial if it is necessary. It might be necessary if important witnesses have
died or are otherwise not available. Of course, the prisoner himself, because
of the passage of time, may be unable to defend himself effectively. Where
many years have elapsed, some may argue that the giving of retroactive effect
is tantamount to outright discharge-on the theory that the prosecution would
have an impossible task of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This
argument fails, however, to take an important factor into account. If many
years have elapsed, it may well be that the prisoner would be unable to prove
satisfactorily that his conviction was based on illegally seized evidence. In
such a case, the new trial stage would not even be reached. In the relatively
rare case where the prisoner is able to prove the fact of illegality at the
preliminary hearing, but the prosecution has insufficient proof for purposes
"change in times" should not be permitted to share in the new right, under a parity

of reasoning it could be countered consistently that the conviction and imprisonment
prior to the enunciation of the new right were valid, but that continued imprisonment
thereafter would be illegal.
132. See note 86 supra.
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of the new trial, the prisoner should be discharged. For, he has served many
years in prison; he has proved illegality and hence entitlement to the new
constitutional protection; and he is ready and willing to stand a new trial.
Just as the prisoner is entitled to the benefit of a new constitutional right
and a new trial only if he has first proven the fact of illegality, the state is
permitted to reincarcerate the prisoner only if it is able to prove guilt upon
the new trial.
If it appears that the giving of retroactivity would place an undue strain
on existing judicial machinery, several courses of action suggest themselves.
Additional special judges could be appointed. Indeed, a separate hearing
tribunal might be created to keep the prisoners' applications out of the
flow of normal court business. While this would undoubtedly be burdensome
upon a given state, it could be made a temporary affair. That is to say, by
court rule, it could be provided that applications for Mapp relief must be made
within a given period of time, such as one or two years, or be forever barred. 133
While it is true that this would involve expense, it should be enough to
say that the granting of a constitutional right is worth the price. The state
may spend its citizenry's money to put a criminal in prison; the state may
and should spend money to keep out of prison one who under the Constitution does not belong there.
The specific procedural vehicles whereby pre-Mapp prisoners may seek
to take advantage of that decision vary greatly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The gamut is run from state and federal habeas corpus to other
comparable post-conviction remedies. Many of these remedies are of such
a complex and evolving nature that an intelligent exploration of them within
the bounds of this paper would be impossible. Some states, perhaps, under
the guise of "lack of remedy," may refuse to accord retroactivity. 34 Others
may feel, and with this the writers agree, that a state must provide the procedural machinery whereby a right under the Federal Constitution is given
effect.' 3 5 It may well be that greater strain will be placed on the delicate
balance of power between the state-and lower federal courts in the area of
habeas corpus if some states refuse to provide a remedy by which retroactive
effect may be given. For, in such cases, since a federal constitutional right
is involved, the aggrieved state prisoner may find his way by habeas corpus
to a lower federal court.' 3 6 Of course, it would be ideal if each state provided
133. If such limitation were set up, prisoners should be apprised of their rights and
provided access at least to Supreme Court reports.

134. Cf. Dowd v. Grayer, 233 Ind. 68, 116 N.E.2d 108 (1953).
135. Cf. Ex Parte Bell, 19 Cal.2d 488, 122 P.2d 22 (1942).
136. See generally, Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Postconviction Remedy for
State Prisoners, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 461 (1960); Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Impact on as Abortive State Proceeding, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1315 (1961) ; Hart, Foreward:
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special machinery for a limited period of time to handle retroactivity business.
In that event, existing state procedures could be kept intact for ordinary
87
judicial business.'
CONCLUSION

In the area of personal constitutional rights, it would appear that there
is no sound course of action other than to accord relief to individuals convicted before the birth of such rights. It has been shown that the courts
generally accord individuals their constitutional rights even though their
original trials ensued in the distant past. The mirage of retroactivity arises
only when one individual reaches the courthouse before another. Certainly,
the granting or withholding of relief should not turn on the pivotal question
of which individual was the faster runner. The loser of the race should not
be prejudicd by the existence of a decision enunciating a new constitutional
right. If anything, his position should be strengthened by the fact that
helpful precedent is now available. Had he won the race to the courthouse,
he would have received his just due. He should not be entitled to less simply
because he had run and lost. While on the surface retroactivity may appear
to pose a problem, careful scrutiny may unmask it and reveal it for what
it is-a mirage.

As has been shown, the application of changing constitutional concepts
to prior fact settings is consistent with modern legal development, sound
analysis, policy, comparative areas, and philosophy. Unfortunately, however, there is a natural tendency on the part of some not to disturb the
status quo. Their inclination, rather, is to battle on "more current" fronts.
Yet individuals in prison should not become "forgotten men," relegated to a
second class citizenship that does not include an expanded Bill of Rights.
Nor should the task of effectuating constitutional rights be left solely to the
option of the states. The Eskridge case stands as a bleak monument to the
failure of at least one state to extend constitutional protection to individuals
behind prison bars.
The Time Chart of the Justices, The Supreme Court, 1958 Term, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84,

122 (1959).
137. Other kinds of relief that might be sought should be noted:
(1) Those who had been convicted without benefit of their constitutional rights as
now envisioned, and who had served their prison terms, might seek restoration
of their civil rights.
(2) Those presently on parole might seek to have their paroles discharged.
(3) Those who had been convicted and sentenced under habitual offender statutes
might seek the reduction of their prison terms by showing that an earlier conviction was brought about through the denial of constitutional rights subsequently recognized. Thus, if retroactive effect were given to Mapp, a person
whose sentence as an habitual offender rested partially on a conviction obtained
through the use of illegally obtained evidence would be entitled to a new
trial and, if successful, a recomputation of his sentence.
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The course of action for the United States Supreme Court is a clear
one. It should speak decisively to assure that all individuals, in the Mapp
setting and in comparable areas, are given the benefit of changing constitutional concepts. Further, the Court may continue to expand personal constitutional rights undaunted by the illusion of retroactivity.
Engaged as it is in a world-wide struggle for the hearts and minds of
men, this nation must not-indeed, it dare not-permit the mirage of retroactivity to result in the denial of liberty and equality to any individual. All
must have the opportunity to partake of the "fruits of liberty." For by the
abundance or lack of such fruit, this great nation shall be judged.

